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***South  Bank  University Abstract:  In this paper  we show that Weintraub:s  consumption 
coefficient  (the ratio of total consumption to wages) can elucidate 
trends in the sectoral and functional distributions  of income  We 
also show that, in a Kaleckian model, it simplifies and add precision 
to Kaleckian macroeconomics.  Using a Kaleckian definition of 
profits, empirical estimates of the coefficient are presented  for the 
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UK lYiZ - 1YYU.  From a level of arouna 1.1 iii  the  i87O!S,  the 
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coefficient rose to around 1.3 in the mid-1980s  from which it has 
started to fall back to its 1970's levels. During the 198Os, the 
coefficient indicated a marked redistribution  of income in favour of 
profits along with a rise in capitalists' propensity  to consume. 
This confirms the evidence that the economic boom of the 1980s was 
driven principally  by an expansion of demand for luxury goods rather 
than fixed capital investment.  This will have been a factor in the 
slump after 1990. Introduction 
It is now fifteen years since Weintraub  (1979, 1981) revealed to a 
sceptical readership how easy it is to simplify and generalise 
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that time the consumption coefficient has gathered dust on the shelf 
and has only rarely been put to serious use  (Heskel et. al., 1982). 
Laramie  (19911, Mair and Laramie  (1992) and Laramie  and Mair  (1993) 
have found it convenient to use the consumption coefficient  as a 
heuristic  device in developing  a Kaleckian model of tax incidence 
without  seriously exploring its properties.  In this paper we 
examine the properties of the consumption coefficient  in more detail 
and produce  empirical estimates  for the UK for the period  1972 - 
1990. 
Weintraub  (1979) proposed the use of a consumption coefficient,  the 
ratin  nf  total  CQp_Sllm.ntinn  e>rnenditllres  to  worker  income.  &_.___  --  I------  r-w--------  -___-_..-,  a_s  ;1 means 
of generalising  Kalecki's profit  function and simplifying 
macroeconomics.  Kalecki  (1968, p.45)  showed that aggregate  profits 
are identical to the sum of gross investment, the government  budget 
deficit, the export surplus and the difference between  capitalist 
consumption  and worker savings.  The consumption coefficient  allows 
the difference  between capitalist  consumption and worker  savings fo 
be expressed  as a function of worker  income.  As a result, a number 
of conventional  "post-Keynesian" assumptions  (Weintraub 1979, p. 101) 
such as workers do not save and/or capitalists do not consume or 
capitalist  consumption equals worker savings used by Kalecki and 
others can be dropped.  Weintraub  introduces this generalisation  into 
a "post-Keynesian"  income determination model. 
We show that the consumption coefficient simplifies and adds 
analytical  precision to Kalecki's macroeconomics,  though  not without 
costs.  The precision  is improved because the structural  parameters 
can be explicitly  identified.  The loss is the cost in dynamic 
elements associated with the relationship between capitalist 
consumption  and profits.  To illustrate the role of the consumption 
coefficient,  we give a brief outline of Kalecki's original model. 
Then we discuss Weintraub's  generalisation,  introduce  it into 
Kalecki's  framework and assess its impact.  Finally, we produce 
estimates  for the consumption coefficient for the UK for the pericd 
1972 -1990 and discuss some of the implications of its movements. 
Evidence  on the behaviour of the aggregate mark up is also provided 
as a corollary. Kalecki's  Model  of  National  Income  Determination 
Kalecki's  national income determination model is developed  from an 
expression  he used to explain labour and capitalist shares in the 
gross income of the private sector, assuming the government  sector is 
---I2  -iL-l-  IN-3  --I_1  /,  nro  rlecjllijlule  \rLdlt!LKl  ,Iz700  p.  40).  Workzr  : ..__....T  n-m  hc,  A;,,;  Aor)  .L,,L”ILLC La,,  UC2 UI”.LU~U 
into: 1) a fixed portion  (salaries) and 2)  a variable portion 
(wages).  The fixed portion represents  income to overhead workers and 
the variable  portion represents  income to workers whose employment 
varies with national income.  Kalecki expressed workers'  share of 
gross income as: 
(1)  W  =  p/Y  +  a; 
where W is worker  income  (gross of taxes), Y is gross private  sector 
income, p > 0,  is  the fixed portion  of worker  income,  0  <  a<l,  is 
the variable  worker income share in gross income. 
From equation  (l),  the level of private  sector gross income is shown 
to depend on the level of profits  (P)  by noting that V = Y - P. 
Substituting  this expression for W in equation  (1) and solving for Y 
yields: 
(2)  y  =  (p  +  PI/(1  -  a) 
Kalecki  (1968,  p. 60) describes how the distribution  factors 
determine private  sector gross income ".....gross income.....is 
pushed up to a point at which profits out of it are determined  by the 
'distribution factors'." 
So far the analysis has dealt only with private  sector gross income 
and has ignored direct and indirect taxes.  To generalise  the 
analysis,  a non-negligible government  sector is introduced.  As a 
result, gross income equals private  sector income plus  indirect 
business taxes: and taxes, direct and indirect, are treated as part 
of the surplus,  (l-l),  where: 
n=  p  +  Tc + Ti = Y' - W; 
where Tc = taxes on all types of capitalist income, Ti = indirect 
business taxes: Y' = aggregate income; and the distribution  factors P’  and a' are adjusted for the inclusion of the indirect business 
taxes.  The reason why  taxes, direct and indirect, are treated  as 
part  of the surplus is because they are not a cost of production  but 
rather, when spent, end up in the pockets of capitalists  as 
illustrated  by Kalecki's famous aphorism  "Workers spend what they 
earn:  capitalists earn what they spend". 
The general expression for aggregate  income is given as: 
(3)  y’  =  $1  + n)!(l  - a'). 
In the general model, the distribution  factors push the level of 
gross national product up to fulfill the requirements  of the profits 
gross of direct and indirect taxes.  In relating aggregate  income to 
investment  and the government budget deficit, among other things, the 
aaareaate  22--z---  orofit function is specified.  Lo___ 
The  Aggregate  Level  of  Profit 
Kalecki  shows that aggregate profits  can be expressed as the 
following  identity: 
(4)  P=I+G-  (T-Q)+X-M+Gc  - ws; 
where  I = gross private investment, G = government purchases,  T = 
gross tax receipts, Q = government  transfer payments,  X = exports, M 
= imports, Cc = capitalist consumption  and Ws = worker  savings. 
Kalecki  (1968, p. 53) transforms equation  (4)  by assuming that 
capitalist  consumption, Cc, can be divided into two parts:  autonomous 
capitalist  consumption and induced capitalist consumption,  which  is a 
lagged  function of profits, where O<q<l, and r is the time lag 
necessary  for a change in profits to change capitalist  consumption. 
By noting that profits in a past period are identical to the left 
hand  side of equation  (4) and that through successive  substitution, 
profits  in any time are equal to a geometric distribution  of past 
expenditures  less worker savings  (weighted by capitalist marginal 
propensity  to consume) plus autonomous  capitalist consumption.  Given 
that the weight given to past expenditures  diminishes  quickly, 
(O<q<l), Kalecki  (1968,  p.54) states  :  "Profits will be a  function 
of  [current expenditure  less worker  savings] and of  [expenditures 
less worker  savings] of the near past: or, roughly speaking, profits 
follow  investment with a time lag".  From this, Kalecki  (1968, pp. 54 
- 56) shows profits, in an "approximate equation", as a multiple  of past expenditures  and worker  savings, i.e.: 
(5)  pt  =  (IIt-n - wst-n + A)/(1 - q) 
where I' = I+G-  (T-Q)+  X - M and n is the time lag necessary 
for a change in expenditures  to effect a change in profits. 
Kalecki's profit  function shows how an injection of spending, e.g. 
investment,  induces additional  capitalist consumption  through an 
initial change in profits and, therefore,  leads to a multiple  change 
in profits. 
With an expression  for aggregate profits, the level of the profits 
gross of direct and indirect taxes is derived by adding  Ti and Tc to 
both sides of  (5).  Kalecki  (1968, pp. 63, 64)  assumed that the 
gross and net levels could be expressed in a linear relationship  and 
thus would have the same independent variables with only the 
coefficients  adjusted.  For example, suppose Tc = a head-tax  and Ti 
= Q = 0, the surplus function can be written as: 
(6)  nt  =  (I”t-n  -  WS~_~  +  A)/(1  -  9) 
where I" = I + G + Q - Tw - q(Tc + Ti) + X - M. 
Kalecki's  Generalised  Expenditure  Model 
Now  that an expression  for profits has been found, national  income 
can be expressed as a function of expenditures.  Substituting  (6) 
into  (3) yields: 
(7)  Y’  =  Pl/(l-a')  t  (I”t_n  -  WS~_~  + A)/(l-a') (1-q). 
Given the difficulty of measuring  worker savings, Kalecki  (1968, p. 
56) drops that expression  from  (7), and thus  (5) and  (6), by assuming 
that worker  savings are correlated with I', gross savings, and he 
adjusts the coefficients A and q impiicitiy.  That is: 
(7')  Y'  = /3'/(1-  a')  +  (I"~_~  t A')/(l-a') (l-q') 
where A' and q' are the adjusted parameters. 
The factors that determine aggregate income can now be summarised. 
These are: the  distribution  factors, p' and a'; capitalists' 
marginal propensity  to consume; autonomous capitalist  consumption; the parameters  in the worker savings function: gross  inVeStIEnt; 
government purchases;  taxes; and the export  surplus. 
Weintraub's  Generalisation:  the  Consumption  Coefficient 
The introduction  of the consumption coefficient  into Kaleckian 
macroeconomics  is somewhat problematic because a sufficient condition 
for the coefficient  to be stable is that the income shares must be 
stable.1  In Kalecki's theory income shares vary with respect to 
changes in aggregate  income.  Weintraub  (1981, pp. 14, 15) shows the 
determinants  of the consumption coefficient.  First, the consumption 
function is given as: 
(8)  C  =  aW  =  c,(W)  + c,k(P'l  +  8; 
assuming the marginal propensity to consume out of transfer income 
equals one: where cw = workers' average propensity  to consume out of 
pre-tax wage income and cr = capitalists'  average propensity  to 
consume and 1 = corporate profit payout ratio.  Now divide both sides 
by W, which yields: 
(9)  a  = 
CW 
+  c,h  (P/W)  +  e/w. 
A sufficient  condition for the stability of the consumption 
coefficient  is that workers' and capitalists' marginal  propensities 
to consume and the ratios of profits to worker  income and transfer 
incomes to worker  incomes remain constant.  However,  in Kalecki's 
framework, the ratio of profits to worker income varies over the 
business  cycle.  For example: 
(10)  d(P/W)/dY'  =  -cx(p),w2  < 0. 
Thus, for the consumption  coefficient to be stable, two possible 
situations arise.  First, offsetting changes in other variables must 
occur, or, second, the consumption coefficient must be extremely 
inelastic with respect to changes in P/W. 
Consider the first case by setting da = 0, i.e.: 
(11)  da  =  0  =  dc,  +  d(c,UP/W))  +  d(e/W)  . 
This condition  seems unreasonable, because  it requires procyclical 
movements  in workers' average propensity to consume out pre-tax wages and salaries,  ceteris paribus,  and in the ratio of transfer payments 
to worker  income, ceteris paribus. 
With respect to the second case, the elasticity  of the consumption 
coefficient  with respect to a change in P/W is given as: 
(12)  [da/d(P/W)  ]  [ (P/W)  /al  =  (-h/a)  (P/W)  <  1; 
assuming that cr is close to zero, the consumption  coefficient  is 
greater than one and P/V is less than one.  Given these assumptions, 
the coefficient,  a, can serve as a good approximation  of the 
relationship  between consumption expenditures  and worker  income even 
when P/W changes over the business cycle.  In either case, the fact 
that income shares or other determinants  vary over the business  cycle 
does not preclude the applicability  of the consumption  coefficient  to 
Kaleckian macroeconomics  because offsetting  changes may arise or the 
consumption  coefficient may be highly inelastic with respect to 
changes in income shares. 
The  Profit  Function 
Above,  we emphasised the role of capitalist expenditures,  so that 
national  income is tied to expenditures  through the profit  function. 
Weintraub's  (1979, pp. 101-106) generalisation  alters the 
specification  of the profit  function and, thus, has implications  for 
Kalecki's  theory of income determination.  Weintraub  generalised 
Kalecki's model to overcome the "Kalecki-Kaldor-Robinson"  hypothesis, 
that is, the assumption that workers do not save, that capitalists  do 
not consume and other similar assumptions,  and, incidentally,  some of 
the statistical problems  in representing  capitalist consumption  less 
worker  savings. 
To derive the profit equation using the consumption  coefficient, 
assume total consumption  is defined as the sum of worker and 
capitalist  consumption and transfer payments,  add and subtract taxes 
on wage and salary income, Tw, government  transfer payments,  0, and 
the wage and salary bill, W, to both sides of  (4), and collect  terms: 
i.e.: 
(13)  P  =  I  +  G -  (Ti + Tc) +  X - M  t  (W)  (a  - 1) 
If a = 1, then the "Kalecki-Kaldor-Robinson"  hypothesis  holds 
(Weintraub, 1979, p. 101). The level of profits,  gross of direct and indirect taxes, is found 
simply by adding Ti and Tc to both sides of  (13): i.e.: 
(14)  l-l  =  I  +  G  +  X-M  +  (W)  (a-l). 
As is shown in  (13) and  (14)  r  the profit  functions are no longer 
represented  as multiples  of past expenditures but now as functions of 
current expenditures  and worker  income. 
Applying  Weintraub's  Generalisation  to  Kaleckian 
Macroeconomics.  In order  to  iiiustrate  the appiication  of 
Weintraub's  generalisation  to Kalecki's model, we express the 
equations  of the model as a function of expenditures.  Noting  that ll 
= P + Ti t Tc and substituting  (4) into  (1') and  (1') into  (13) 
3  \  /  I7  __.I  \ 
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yields: 
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(13)  p  =  [ (1-a:  j /(i-as!  j j 
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Adding  (Ti + Tc)  to both sides of  (15) yields: 
(16)  I7  =  [  (1-a')/(l-aa')]  [I + G + X - M] t p'  (a-l)/(l-aa') 
BY combining  (16) with  (3), aggregate income can be expressed as a 
function of expenditures:  i.e.: 
(17)  Y' =  (p~~/(l-~~l)) +  [I t G + X - Ml/Cl-aa') 
We present  the statics of this Kaleckian model to highlight the role 
of the consumption  coefficient.  The statics can be easily derived by 
differentiating  (14), (15), (16) and  (17)  with respect to E  (E = I + 










a/*  =  (1-a')/(l-aa') > 0, if 1 > aa'; 
dyl/m  = l/(1-aa') > 0, if 1 > aa'; 
m/da'  =  [E + P'a)(a-1)  ]/(1-aa1)2 > 0, if a > 1; 
dY'/da' = a[  (p'  t E)/(l-aa1)2]  > 0; 
mi*:  = 
(a-ij/(i-aa’j  >  0,  if  a  >  1; 
dY'/dp' = a/(1-aa') > 0, if 1 > an'; 
m/da  = aE(l-a)/  (1-aa1)2  > 0; and 
dy'/da =  (p'  t E)/(l-aa1)2  > 0. 
Perhaps  the most  interesting aspect of the comparative  statics is the role of the consumption  coefficient in determining  the relationship 
between the distribution  factors, the fixed portion  of worker  income 
and the wage share, and the aggregate level of profits.  If a > 1, 
changes in the distribution  factors are positively  related to the 
level of profits.  This result corresponds approximately  to the 
stagnationist  regime described by Bhaduri and Marglin  (19901, 
al  thnrrmh  their  ovhilzrs+innist  ronimp  wm11d  nrr~~r  when  the  uILII"uyAl  LAIL-IL  Lc..I**uA_vcIv..I"L  'b‘j&..k-  ..--...- vIIL&  .  .  .._.. 
consumption  coefficient  is less than one.  In the stagnationist 
regime, a decline in the wage share would reduce economic activity by 
adversely  affecting profits and, thus, future investment and future 
economic activity. 
Impact  of  Weintraub's  Generalisation  on  Kaleckian 
Macroeconomics  Weintraub's  generalisation  of the profit 
function affects Kaleckian macroeconomics  by altering the multiplier 
impact of expenditures  on profits.  Kalecki's  original profit 
function was expressed as a multiple of past expenditures.  With 
Weintraub's  generalisation,  the profit function depends on current 
expenditures.  With Kalecki's profit function, autonomous 
expenditures  induce additional capitalist consumption  through a lag 
and, therefore, push up the level of national product,  according to 
the distribution  factors, to fulfill the.surplus  requirements.  In 
contrast, Weintraub's  generalisation  does not explicitly  consider the 
impact of autonomous  expenditures on capitaiist  consumption and thus 
forces the multiplier  to work itself out completely  in the current 
period  as implied in equations  (21)  and  (22) above.  To illustrate 
this difference,  consider a change in the impact of investment on 
profits  in both approaches.  In Kalecki's original  approach  (see 
equation  (5)  1, a El change in investment is equal to a dollar change 
in profits  in the current period and the El change  in profits  induces 
additional  capitalist consumption in the future and, therefore, 
induces additional profits  in the future.  With Weintraub's 
generalisation  (see equation  (14)), assuming a = 1, a 51 change in 
investment  causes a El change in profits  in the current 
period.....  end of story.  Thus, Weintraub's  generalisation  eliminates 
one of the dynamic elements in Kalecki's model  and changes the lag 
structure of the business  cycle equation.  We consider these changes 
to be substantive. 
With the exception of the loss of one dynamic element, Weintraub's 
generalisation  provides  two advantages over Kalecki's  original 
formulation.  First, the approach is simpler and involves fewer 
assumptions  than Kalecki's  original approach.  For example, in deriving  the reduced form expression  for national product  (equation 
(9')), Kalecki had to make assumptions about the tax structure and 
about the relationship between worker savings and gross savings. 
With Weintraub's  generalisation,  these assumptions  are not necessary. 
Second  rr+,-.,P+?Yr=,  eh=nnnc 
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in Kalecki's  original formulation.  For example,  if capitalists' 
marginal  propensity  to consume and workers' marginal  propensity  to 
save are unknown, then it is uncertain how changes in the 
distribution  factors influence the surplus  (profits) and national 
product.  With a known consumption  coefficient, the impact of changes 
in the distribution  factors on the surplus can be readily assessed. 
The usefulness  of the consumption  coefficient is ultimately  an 
empirical  question and we now proceed to examine  its behaviour  in the 
UK for the period  1972 - 1990. 
Consumption  Coefficient  for  the  UK  1972  -  1990 
Whether  or not the consumption coefficient has analytical merit is 
essentially  an empirical issue.  Weintraub  (1979) produced  values of 
a for the US, Canada and the UK for the period  1960 - 1975, defining 
a as the ratio of total consumption outlay, C, to the wage bill, W. 
For the UK he showed a falling from 1.10  .in  1960 to 0.92 in 1975. 
However, this definition of a is deficient in two respects.  First, 
it fails to take account of the context in which the Kaldor  - Kalecki 
- Robinson  hypothesis was formulated, namely a "classical"  commodity 
economy  (Weintraub, 1978; Kregel, 1977; Shaikh et. al., 1985; Tonak, 
1983).  In such an economy, it is necessary to treat the wages and 
salaries of government employees as a transfer payment.  Second, 
expressing  a as C/W precludes  any analysis of its determinants. 
For these reasons, we think it is useful to produce more detailed 
estimates  of the consumption coefficient in order to examine its 
properties  more thoroughly.  All the data we use below to calculate a 
are taken from UK official statistics, but there are two important 
qualifications  to be made.  First, as we note above, the wages and 
salaries of government employees  should not be regarded as part of 
the wage bill but rather as a category of transfer payments.  UK 
XT-c:?.--.,  n--.....-i-  z A,.-+  .’ c..  _,...,.-___^_&  . .__^^  ‘YaLJ_"l,d.l  PLIcC"LlIIl_>  IIle'IILILy  LjJu"eLlLlllellL  wage> and salaries as a 
separate item since 1972, so that the estimates of a presented  below 
start from that year.  Transfer payments are defined to include 
government  wages and salaries as well as the more  conventional  items 
such as Social Security benefits, pensions etc.. Second, we use the "Kaleckian" definition of profits  developed  by 
Toporowski  (1993a) on the grounds that official statistics  of  profits 
in the UK have been distorted by changes in accounting  practices  and 
taxation, by privatisation  and by the arbitrary allocation  of profits 
by multinational  companies.  Kalecki's theory of profits provides  a 
way of systematically determining  gross profits  in national  income 
that overcomes these biases.  We use this "Kaleckian" approach, 
therefore,  in the definition of profits in the equations  below. 
The derivation of a is given in equations  (8) and  (9) above.  We 
estimate the consumption coefficient  from equation  (9) for the UK for 
the period  1972 to 1990 in the following way.  The data are from 
C_^_,.-^.'^  m,,,?J- Annual  C,rnr.,hmh*+  7 003  =...A  TTV x,9+;r\n=1  nnr.nr,n+r  LL"‘I"IILIL  ILe,,Ll>,  Ju~~lelLlellL.,  .L??L  a‘lu  “L\  IYQLL”VI1a.1 IILL”UIIC3, 
1992. 
CW 
=  1  -  (  personal  savings ratio  (ET, Table  5) + total 
disposable  income/total personal  income before tax  (ET, Table  5)  1. 
cr  =  capitalist consumption/capitalist  income. 
capitalist consumption = total consumer expenditure  (ET, 
Table 5).-  (after tax wages and salaries  (net of savings)  (ET, Table 
5) + transfer payments  (UK  National Accounts 1992, Table  3.1)). 
capitaiist income = payments of dividends by UK companies 
and financial institutions  (ET, Table 38) + income from self 
employment  (UK  National Accounts,  1992, Table 4.1). 
1  =  dividends  (ET, Table  38)/total corporate  income  (ET, 
__1__(  -%n\  Laoie JU) 
P =  (gross domestic  fixed capital formation of industrial 
and commercial  companies and financial companies and institutions 
(ET, Table 37) minus stock appreciation  (ET, Table  38)  1  +  UK public 
sector deficit  (ET, Table 36) f UK current account  surplus  (ET, Table 
30) - cyclical saving  (ET, Table 5) + corporate taxes on income and 
capital  (UK  National Accounts,  1992, Table 5.1). 
8  =  transfer payments  (UK National Accounts,  1992, Table 9.1) 
+ government wages and salaries  (  UK National accounts,  1992, Table 
9.4). 
W = pre-tax wages and salaries  (ET, Table 5). 
We test for the consistency of a calculated in the above manner by 
plotting  it against C/W  (see Figure  1).  As can be seen a and C/W 
move closely together, particularly  from 1975 - 1985, and the small 
differences  between the two series can probably be attributed  to the 
increasing  inaccuracies  in UK national income data of recent years. 
We regard the consistency of the two series as confirmation  of our 
use of Kalecki's definition of profits We present  in Table 1 our estimates of the determinants  of the 
consumption  coefficient.  Weintraub  (1981, p. 15) argues that cw < 1 
because of payment of taxes  (tw) and some saving out of wage and 
salary income  (SW).  Thus, cw = 1 -  (sw  +  tw)  and whether a >=< 1 
depends on whether  (sw + t,) <=> crA_P/W  + e/W (see equation  9).  The 
consumption  coefficient  is greater than one for the whole period and, 
as we show in Figure  2, sw + t, <  c&P/W  +  e/W which  is as 
hypothesised  by Weintraub. 
Behaviour  of  the  Consumption  Coefficient,  1972  -  1990 
With what we consider to be a reasonably reliable estimate  of a for 
the UK for the period  1972 - 1990, the question now is to find an 
explanation  of its behaviour.  From 1972 - 1980, a moved  in the range 
1.10 - 1.15, but from 1981 - 1988 it rose to around  1.25 - 1.30 
before  starting to fall back again towards its level of the 1970s. 
In Figure  3, we AC.,.r\m~.-.rh  nnnc-+;+,,an+  nlcxmhn+" 
UCL"lqJ"3~  a  ;nto  Its  L"113LILusI.c  51cz111c111-3.  The 
average propensity  to consume out of wage income, cw, has remained 
little changed over the period  at around 0.7.  The movement  in a, 
particularly  since 1979, has been driven by two forces, a change in 
the distribution  of income in favour of profits as shown by the 
increase in P/W and a rise in the propensity  to consume out of 
n=n:+  -1;  c-+  ;nr.nmn  lT'rr\m 
L.apl'Q1LaL  IIILVIILG,  cr.  A.  L"ILL 
2  ?&! 
1::  19??, 
?-he  voPn.,PT\,  ip,  p/w  T_lZC 
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reversed temporarily  in 1978/79 but thereafter  resumed  its upward 
path peaking  in 1985 from which it has fallen back to the levels of 
the late 1970s.  This increase up to 1985 in P/W was reinforced by 
the increase in cr, which began in 1979 and peaked  in 1988 from which 
it has fallen sharply. 
Changes  in  Income  Distribution  in  the  UK  in  the  1970's  and 
1980s  This change  in the distribution  of income  indicated by 
a accords with what else is known about changes in income 
distribution  in the UK in the 1980s.  Jenkins'  (1991) detailed  study 
of the UK in the 1970's and 1980s shows that at the bottom  end of the 
distribution  real incomes have hardly changed in twenty years.  In 
the top five deciles, income growth was more noticeable,  especially 
in the 198Os, with the biggest gain being in the top decile. 
For the top 10 per cent, average real income in 1988 was 1.8 times 
that in 1967, corresponding  to an annual compound growth  rate of 
almost  3 per cent between  1967 and 1988 which more than doubied 
between  1984 and 1988. It is a reasonable  assumption that the personal,  or household, 
distribution  of profits is concentrated  in the top decile,  so that 
Jenkin's  figures, which are derived primarily  from Family Expenditure 
Survey  sources,  reflect the shift in the distribution  of income in 
r_~~_~~~~  _r _--_T__  .._.___,__1  d_ p:_.__  ravour or prorlr;s revedleu  111  CL~UL~  3.  'B'k--  T"'AA  yv*Ie:II  allJ.czu  tG  th2  iilCi2FiS~ 
in the propensity  to consume out of capitalist  income also shown in 
Figure  3, this suggests an absolute and relative  increase in the 
consumption  of "luxury" goods, certainly  in the middle years  of the 
decade.  Conversely,  the bottom  five quintiles  have shown little 
gain in real income since 1967, which, when allied to the more or 
less constant propensity  to consume, cw, shown in Figure 3, suggests 
that there will have been an absolute and relative decline  in the 
consumption  of "wage" goods bought out of wage income. 
This pattern  is confirmed by further reference to the consumption 
coefficient.  The Kaldor - Kalecki - Robinson theorem that profits 
equals  investment  follows when a = 1.  With profits  heavily dependent 
on investment  and the consumption coefficient  responsive  to profits, 
the wage share, a, corresponds to the ratio of consumption  to income, 
C/Y, and the profits  share, P/Y, corresponds  to the ratio of 
investment  to income, I/Y, when P = I and a = 1.  Conversely,  if P > 
I, then a > 1 and W/Y < C/Y.  As shown in Figure  4,  profits  (P) 
have indeed been heavily dependent on investment  (I) in the UK since 
1972  (and P > I for 1980 - 1987) and with a > 1, then W/Y < C/Y which 
is confirmed  in Figure 5.  C/Y has been on an upward trend in the UK 
since 1979180 while W/Y has been on a downward trend which confiLms 
the diverging movements  in the relative income shares of profits and 
wages suggested by Jenkins' analysis. 
Distributional  Effects  of  Housing  as  a  Wage  and  a  Luxury 
Good  One plausible  explanation  of what has happened  to 
relative  income shares in the UK, particularly  in the 1980s is 
provided by Toporowski  (1993b) who challenges the "trickle-down" 
effect of supply side economics, according to which a redistribution 
of income  in favour of those on higher incomes is supposed to 
generate  sufficient  growth of income to make everybody better off. 
A redistribution  of this kind can cause a reaiiocation  of resources 
to the production  of "luxury" goods, reducing the supply of "wage" 
good commodities  in whose production these resources are used.  This 
issue of changes  in the distribution of income being caused by and 
giving rise to changes in the composition of expenditure  and 
production  was recognised by Kalecki  (19371, when, in response to a criticism  from Keynes that his assumptions about capitalists' 
consumption  were not clear, 
-^-^_  I,?.  he added this footnote to his paper  A 
Theory of Commodity,  Income and Capital Taxation": 
11 
.  .  .  .  capitalist consumption  is partly directed to wage 
goods, the increase in the price of which  [as a consequence 
of an increase in taxation on wage goods] may cause a rise 
in capitalists!  ^..-^-^li+..__  __ ..___  __hrln  3-A  eX~t!llLU.LULt:  "II  wayjt:  y"vu3 alla  a fall  iR  the 
purchases  of other goods subject to their consumption.  Then 
a corresponding  shift in output will take place". 
(Kalecki,1937, reprinted in Kalecki,l971, p. 38). 
The  process by which a change in the distribution of income can 
alter the composition of expenditure  and lead to a shift in output  is 
argued as follows.  Consider a commodity whose supply is fixed in 
the time period under consideration  and which is purchased by both 
capitalists  and by workers, i.e. it is both a "luxury" good and a 
"wage" good.  Assume for the present that the income elasticity  of 
demand for this commodity is the same for all classes.  If income is 
distributed  from wages to profits, then total nominal income, demand 
and supply stay the same, but because a higher proportion  of the 
supply of the commodity is now bought out of profits, the commodity 
becomes more of a "luxury" good. 
Assume  the redistribution  of income is effected by an increase in 
nominal profits  (for  example, by cutting tax rates on higher  incomes 
or profits),  while nominal wages remain the same.  In order to 
examine the pure  "distribution" effect, assume that total supply 
remains fixed.  The price of the commodity will, therefore,  rise to 
equalise demand and supply and profits will rise for its producers. 
With nominal wages fixed,  (because with output remaining constant, 
supply and demand in the labour market  remain the same) real wages 
will fall fractionally due to the higher price of the commodity. 
These two effects will further raise the share of total income of 
capitalists,  or those on highest incomes. 
One commodity that is consumed as both a "wage" good and a "luxury" 
good is housing and its aggregate supply is generally regarded as 
fixed in the short run.  The income elasticities  of demand for 
housing as a 'iwageii  good and as a "iuxuryzF  good are unlikeiy to be 
the same.  As a "luxury" good, the demand  for housing is relatively 
income-elastic,  whereas as a "wage" good its demand is relatively income-inelastic.  As a consequence, when income is redistributed 
from wages to profits, the demand for housing as a "luxury" good 
rises relatively  rapidly, while demand for housing as a "wage" good 
does not fall by much.  Thus, with the total supply of housing  fixed 
in the short period, a redistribution  of income from wages to profits 
results in higher prices  in the housing market  contributing  to house 
price inflation and a switch from housing as a "wage" good to housing 
as a "luxury II  good. 
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A corollary of the fall in W/Y  (and the increases  in P/W and a) noted 
in Figure  5 is that the markup, which reflects the degree of 
monopoly,  will have risen  (ignoring the effects of an increase in the 
ratio of imports to wage bill--see Kalecki,  1968, p. 29)  This 
follows from the national income identity that the value of output, 
(PO\. quals  g1os.s  incorne  \-  L,  I  ;  (Y!  : 
(30)  Y = PQ = kwN; 
where k =  (Y/wN) = l/(W/Y)  (=  the markup). 
We follow Weintraub  (1979) in regarding markup  as an empirical 
coefficient  covering the entire business'sector  rather than Kalecki's 
narrower definition  restricted to the manufacturing  sector only.  As 
we demonstrate  in Figure 6, the markup has risen sharply in the UK 
from a level of around 2.1 in the early 1970s to around 2.4 - 2.5 in 
the mid 1980s before falling back to 2.25 by 1990.  The factors 
influencing the markup are compiex and stiii oniy imperfectiy 
understood  (Reynolds, 1983). 
Kalecki  (1954, p. 18) argued that the existence  of powerful  trade 
unions might tend to reduce profit margins on the grounds that a high 
ratio of profits  to wages strengthens their bargaining  position  in 
their demand  for wage increases.  Markups and, hence, the 
distribution  of income will be influenced by the power of trade 
unions although,  as Reynolds observes, the dynamic structure of the 
process  is still very unclear.  Kalecki, of course, was writing  at a 
time when trade union membership and power were high.  A major 
feature of the period  since 1979 has been the substantial  fall in 
trade union membership  and in the political  and economic  influence of 
the trade unions. 
Between 1980 and 1990 the Conservative government  introduced a series 
of statutes affecting  industrial relations in the UK in such areas as the right to strike, the closed shop, trade union government, trade 
union recognition  and minimum wage fixing.  The evidence concerning 
the effect of this legislation on the ability of unions to bid up 
wages is conflicting.  Brown and Wadhwani  (1990) find no evidence 
that the legislation  reduced the ability of unions to bid up wages  in 
the 1980s.  By contrast, however, Layard and Nickel1  (1987) find 
that while the trend in the trade union markup  (  the markup of union 
over non-union wages) had been upward to 1982, the decline in union 
membership  after 1979 and the impact of the trade union legislation 
of the 1980s had caused the gap between union and non- union wages to 
narrow.  The Layard  and Nickel1 results lend support to the upward 
movement  in business markups which we have identified above. 
We are not claiming to have provided exhaustive proof of the reasons 
for the shift in income shares in the UK in the 1980s highlighted  by 
the consumption  coefficient.  What we are arguing is that use of the 
rnoffiriont  allnws  12s  t-  fnmls  nrc.risQlv  op.  k_ey  macrnornnnmir  asnertc  b"L.LLII*b....  V-*./.7"  LVIY"  i-""'U-J  .  ..UILV._~"**V*.LA_~  u'yu'-' 
of the 1980s which was, after all, Weintraub's  intention when he 
developed a as a simplifying device. 
Conclusion 
Weintraub's  consumption  coefficient simplifies  Kaleckian 
macroeconomics  by eliminating the necessity to measure  the difference 
between  capitalist  consumption and worker  savings when deriving 
empirical measures  of profits.  The use of the coefficient  is not 
without  cost as its introduction eliminates  one of the dynamic 
channels in Kaleckian macroeconomics--namely  the relationship  between 
aggregate profits  and capitalist marginal propensity  to consume.  The 
consumption  coefficient allows for a simplification  of the 
macroeconomic  statics.  For example, knowledge  of the  value of a 
permits  an assessment  of how the distribution  parameters  affect the 
level of profits  (future investment and incomes).  Our evidence 
confirms that the consumption coefficient  is greater than one and has 
been rising in recent years.  The rise in a, ‘hoiding  other things 
constant,  suggests that the levels of aggregate profits and income 
have been pushed  up.  However, the rise in a has been accompanied by 
higher mark ups and a reduction in the wage share.  These latter 
effects, with a consumption coefficient greater than one, have a 
negative  impact on current profits, future  investment and growth.  In 
short, the rising  consumption coefficient,  although  it boosts 
aggregate  demand holding other things constant, has heightened 
stagnationist  tendencies  in an era when the Conservative  government has been hostile to labour and where the raison d'etre of fiscal 
policy  has been to trickle down.  The rise in the consumption 
coefficient,  combined with a fall in the share of wages,  indicates 
that the redistribution  of income from wages to profits has induced 
higher expenditure  on luxury consumption out of profits, rather than 
on fixed capital investment, resulting in the weak trend of growth  in 
_^_'I  -----_.:?.  _^C<._<C..  "i..,.rr  +k, ln7rl^  led1 ecurlullllC;  dLLI"lLY  3111Lt:  L11e  I>,">. 
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